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5.  
The Russo-Japanese War and the Perception of the Japanese Army in 
Imperial Germany 
Frank Jacob 
The Russo-Japanese War (1904/5) between Czarist Russia and Imperial Japan was an 
expansionist war for influence in Korea. It was also the first war between industrialized 
powers in the 20th century and should, with all its new technologies and the increased level 
of destruction, have pointed towards the First World War a decade later. Contemporaries 
like Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919) realized that the Russo-Japanese War highlighted the 
interrelations between events far away from Europe and the great power politics in the 
capitals of the latter continent.  The war was, after all, a historical watershed of global 1
importance.  In Japan, this war was even more important than the Great War, as it marked 2
the end of Japan’s successful modernization process and international acceptance of a 
great power of equal rank to the Western ones.  The role of the Japanese Empire during 3
the war was also often perceived as that of a defender of democratic ideas against an 
autocratic and backward Czarist Empire, an image as depicted, for example, in the 
writings of famous US travel writer and “Russia expert” George Kennan the Elder 
(1845-1924).  This image was also shared by British news reports, and the military 4
correspondent of The Times highlights the importance of the Japanese victories over the 
Russian armies in Manchuria for international observers: 
No great campaign fought out within the memory of this generation offers such a vast and fruitful field 
for study by men of the British race as the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. For the first time for nearly 
a hundred years we have seen an island Empire at grips with a first-rate continental Power. For the 
 Rosa Luxemburg, “In the Storm,” (1904). Accessed June 27, 2015. http://www.marxists.org/archive/1
luxemburg/1904/05/01.htm.  
 For a detailed analysis of this global impact see: Frank Jacob, The Russo-Japanese War and Its Shaping 2
of the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 2018). 
 The importance of the war in Japan is also resembled in many publications related to its centennial in 3
2004/5. Some of them are Nichi-Ro Sensō to Higashi Ajia sekai (The Russo-Japanese War and the East 
Asian World), ed. Higashi Ajia Kindaishi Gakkai (The Academic Society for the Modern History of East Asia) 
(Tokyo: Yumani Shobō, 2008); Numata Takazō, Nichi-Ro rikusen shinshi (A New History of the Land Battles 
of the Russo-Japanese War) (Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō, 2004); Tsuchiya Yoshifuru, Teikoku no tasogare, mikan no 
kokumin: Nichi-Ro Sensō, Daiichiji kakumei to roshia no shakai (The Twilight of the Empire, the Unfinished 
Nation: The Russo-Japanese  War, the First Revolution and Russian Society) (Tokyo: Seibunsha, 2012); 
Yomiura Shinbun Shuzaihan, Kenshō Nichi-Ro Sensō (Analysis of the Russo-Japanese War) (Tokyo: Chūō 
Kōron Shinsha, 2005). Despite these rather recent publications, which are just a few examples, there are 
also very good earlier studies, like Shimomura Fujio, Nichi-Ro Sensō (The Russo-Japanese War) (Tokyo: 
Jinbutsu Ōraisha, 1966), to name just one example.  
 Kennan published more than 20 articles on the war, e.g. George Kennan, “War by Prearrangement,” 4
Outlook 77 (August 13, 1904), 977-983 and George Kennan, “A Japanese Naval School,” Outlook 77 
(August 27, 1904), 890-896.  
first time the new machinery with which science and modern invention have endowed the navies of the 
world has been put to the practical test of serious war. For the first time, almost in the history of the 
world, we have seen naval and military forces, directed by master hands, co-operating in close and 
cordial fashion to impose, by their united efforts, the national will upon the enemy.  5
The present chapter, however, will focus on the perception of the war and the Japanese 
soldiers by the German military, whose representatives were quite interested in the events 
of the Far East. The government in Berlin and Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859-1941) had hoped to 
bind Russia closer to Germany during the conflict, but failed to gain a full reciprocal 
alliance with the Czarist Empire, although the Emperor and the Czar had drafted such an 
agreement during the war.  More important, however, was the impact of the war, when it 6
came to German military planning in the aftermath. It was the perception of Japanese 
strength and Russian weakness that would define Germany’s future military goals and 
chances alike, which will be discussed in more detail in the second part of the present 
chapter. 
The German Observation of the War 
In the beginning, German military and naval officers were sceptics when the chance of a 
Japanese victory in a war against Russia was considered. Like many others, the German 
military observers did not believe that the tiny island nation would stand a chance against 
the Russian “steam roller” everyone had been fearing in a war scenario on the European 
continent.  Naval officers, however, were keen to know more about the actual performance 7
of modern ships and especially naval artillery, which is why the observation of the events 
by German officers was specifically requested.  Wilhelm II, i.e. “Admiral Berlin”, 8
consequently sent naval officers to the Far East to observe the war and ordered them 
a) To gather experience of the impact of modern armory against modern targets.  
b) To form an opinion about the tactics and use of modern squadrons, ships and torpedo boats at 
day and night. 
 Military Correspondent of The Times, The War in the Far East 1904-1905 (New York: E. P. Dutton and 5
Company , 1905), 1. 
 Nicholas II to Wilhelm II, Peterhof, October, 7, 1905 in Die Große Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 6
1871-1914: Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, eds. Johannes Lepsius et al., 40 
vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-1927) (henceforth GP), No. 
6247. I will identify the specific documents by their No. All the relevant documents can be found in vol. 19.1 
and 19.2. 
 Philip Towle, “The Russo-Japanese War and the Defence of India,” Military Affairs 44:3 (1980), 113.  7
 Commander of the Naval Station of the North Sea to the Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy, 8
Wilhelmshaven, February 28, 1904, Federal Archives, Military Archive Freiburg i. Brsg., Germany (henceforth 
BArch MArch), RM 5/5777.  
c) To gather experience of the execution of larger troop transports and landing operations, on the 
necessary and suitable food supplies and facilities, and on the method of joint ventures between 
army and naval administration.  
d) To closely study the material and personnel capabilities of the participating naval force.  9
In contrast to other observing nations, Germany had access to the Russian perspective of 
the war and Wilhelm could send his officers to Port Arthur, from where they would send 
their reports about the war effort of the Czarist Empire. The reports highlighted the bad 
situation of the Russian fleet, especially considering the low morale of its sailors. The 
German military experts had clearly overrated the potential of the Czarist Navy.  The 10
victories of the Japanese Navy, commanded by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō (1848-1934), 
highlighted that better ships – in this case built in Britain – as well as better training and 
morale were important for Japan’s success. One of the reports from August 1904 
emphasizes the results of accurate Japanese artillery bombardments for the Russian 
cruiser Gromoboi at Ulsan and draws the following conclusion from the first naval battles 
of the war: “Now, armored protection, protection and again protection is necessary. This 
battle answered many questions.”  11
These early observations were further proved by the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905, in 
which the Japanese fleet was eventually able to destroy the menace of Russian ships in 
the region and force the Czar and his government in St. Petersburg to accept the 
necessity for peace talks.  While submarines had also been active during the war, they 12
had not yet played an important role.  More effective were torpedo boats, which would 13
launch torpedoes against the Russian fleet during the surprise attack on the Russian fleet 
at Port Arthur in early February 1904, especially since the torpedo nets that were 
supposed to protect the ships were practically useless.  14
However, the Japanese soldiers were not only successful on sea, but also on land – the 
Russian troops stood no chance against the Asian enemy. The so-called “Prussians of 
 Wilhelm II, Order for the Naval Officers Sent to the Russian or Japanese Forces, Berlin, February 13, 1904, 9
BArch MArch, RM 5/5772.  
 Report of Bonsart von Schellendorf, Major in the General Staff, Schettnienen, July 14, 1905, BArch 10
MArch, RM 5/5773.  
 Battle Report of Captain Finograzky, Commander of the Cruiser Gromoboi, Wladiwostok, August 14, 1904, 11
BArch MArch RM 5/5773. On the battle of the Gromoboi at Ulsan on 14 August 1904, see Peter Brook, 
Armoured Cruiser vs. Armoured Cruiser: Ulsan 14 August 1904 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2000).  
 On the Battle of Tsushima see: Frank Jacob, Tsushima 1905: Ostasiens Trafalgar (Paderborn: Schöningh, 12
2017). 
 Naval Attaché for the Nordic Empires, Paul von Hintze, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial 13
Naval Office, Berlin, St. Petersburg, November 17, 1904, BArch MArch, RM 5/5769.  
 Secret Report of the Imperial Dockyard Kiel, Scheibe, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial Naval 14
Office in Berlin, Kiel, June 28, 1906, BArch MArch RM 5/5771, 4-5.
Asia” – as they were called due to the initial training of the Japanese General Staff by 
Prussian officers, like Jacob Meckel (1842-1905), who had served as a military advisor to 
the Japanese Army in the years after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, namely in the early to 
mid-1880s – gained battle after battle and the German newspapers joined the international 
laudation of Japan’s military apparatus.  The first land battle at the Yalu River, which 15
marked the border between Korea and Manchuria, was the first Japanese victory against a 
Western nation, and was a real surprise.  
General Kuroki Tamemoto (1844-1923) had to cross the river with his 42,000 men, while 
19,000 Russians defended the positions on the antagonists’ side.  The Japanese were 16
able to cross the river very quickly and defeated the Czarist army without much resistance. 
This was a pattern that would characterize the initial period of the war, when General 
Alexei Kuropatkin (1848-1925), the supreme commander of the Russian Army during the 
Russo-Japanese War and War Minister, was eager to avoid a direct confrontation and the 
possible annihilation of his troops in the region until the Trans-Siberian Railway had 
transported sufficient additional troops to the war zone from European Russia. For him, 
like for most observers after the Japanese success at the Yalu, it was obvious that the 
present war was everything but a little colonial war, as the Western powers had known 
from the previous centuries.  The Japanese crossed the river in only one night, before 17
launching a large scale attack on the positions of Russian commander Mikhail Zasulich 
(1843-1910) on 1 May 1904, who could only eventually withdraw his troops to Liaoyang.  
Eberhard von Tettau (1857-1922), who accompanied the Russian army as a military 
observer for the German Empire, later highlighted the importance of heavy guns: “120 
Japanese guns fired at the same time … The few Russian guns tried to return fire, but 
were immediately silenced.”  The Czarist Army also had problems with coordination 18
during the battle, and friendly fire caused quite a lot of casualties. The better training of the 
Japanese soldiers was obvious and the amount of munitions and shells used that day 
 “Der Japanismus im Schwinden,” Hamburger Nachrichten 710 (October 8, 1904), Federal Archives Berlin 15
(henceforth BArch), R 8034-II/8170.  
 John W. Steinberg, “The Operational Overview,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: 16
World War Zero, vol.1, eds. John W. Steinberg et al. (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 111. Freiherr Eberhard von 
Tettau, Achtzehn Monate beim Heere Russlands (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1907), vol. 1, 89, however, 
speaks of 5,600 Russians and 36,000 Japanese. For a detailed account of the battle, see: Ibid., 85-106.  
 See, for example, the comparative evaluation in: “Buren- und japanische Taktik,” Der Tag 445, September 17
22, 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170.  
 Tettau, Achtzehn Monate, 90.18
already highlighted the fact that a new age of warfare had begun.  This was also visible 19
with regard to the high number of casualties, counting 2,000 men on the Russian side and 
900 on the Japanese side.  While many international observers realized the Japanese 20
superiority on the battlefield and argued it to be related to better planning and preparation, 
as well as better equipment and the higher morale of the troops from the island nation, 
Tettau instead highlighted the Russian incompetence, especially when describing the role 
of the Czarist officers in the defeats and steady retreats that followed the Battle of the Yalu. 
According to him, it was not the Russian soldiers that had failed, as the typical man in the 
Czar’s troops was “[l]oyal, self-denying, totally trusting his officer, the Russian soldier 
provides solid material in the hand of good capable leaders, which is almost incomparable 
among other armies of the world. … The fact that this excellent material failed anyway had 
multiple reasons; they were due to the way of preparation and the use of the material.”  It 21
is clear that the German observer pointed the finger towards his officer colleagues in the 
Russian Army, while at the same time arguing that, with better leadership, the Czarist 
soldiers could easily be superior. In some way, it was obvious what impact education, in 
the case of the Japanese Army a Prussian military education, could have. The war 
consequently did not only prove Japan’s capability to hold its own in a military contest with 
Russia, it indirectly also proved the superiority of the German military education over the 
one that had produced the weak military leadership within the Czarist forces.  
The German press, however, also emphasized racist arguments for Russia’s defeat, as 
the Eastern European empire could not be considered truly Western, but rather had to be 
seen as a “half-Asia[n]”  power. In military circles, however, there was also an expression 22
of understanding for Kuropatkin’s tactics, who did not want to lose his army in the region, 
leaving it totally undefended against the Japanese, while he was waiting for 
reinforcements from Europe.  Yet the worth of such a long period of inactivity that caused 23
countless casualties and gave the Japanese all the time necessary to take over important 
 A. L. Haldane, “Fourth Japanese Army: Operations from the Date of its Disembarkation in Manchuria to 19
the 31st July 1904,” in The Russo-Japanese War. Reports from British Officers Attached to the Japanese 
and Russian Forces in the Field, vol. 1 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1908), 129; C. V. Hume, “First 
Japanese Army: The Battle of the Ya-Lu; lecture given by a Japanese General Staff Officer, with remarks by 
Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton,” in The Russo-Japanese War. Reports from British Officers Attached to the 
Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field, vol. 1 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1908), 15-18.
 Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1904), 100.20
 Tettau, Achtzehn Monate, IV.  21
 “Die gelbe Gefahr,” Deutsche Tageszeitung 115, May 28, 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8169.  22
 Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg, Beihefte zur Marine-Rundschau, 94.  23
strategic positions was also discussed.  One important aspect that probably clouded the 24
German view of Russia’s military potential in the following years was the problems the 
Czarist Empire faced with regard to the mobilization and transport of troops to East Asia.  25
At the same time, the Russian soldier was neither well trained, nor well treated, sometimes 
even provided with food that could no longer be eaten.  The bad morale of Russian 26
officers in Manchuria was probably also related to the region, where there was a “poor 
rations and munitions supply and a command expectation of reinforcements, which 
explained the inactivity that had such a debilitating effect on morale.”  All in all, the loyalty 27
of the Russian soldiers and officers was not very strong, and military order could collapse 
in the first moment of pressure. A report by the German General Consulate in China also 
reported that the Russian sailors whose ship was interned in Shanghai in December 1904 
seemed to be only interested in amusement, instead of getting back to Russia to fight the 
enemy again.  28
All in all, the war evoked a rather negative image of the Russian Army in Germany.  This, 29
at the same time, stimulated a positive perception of the performance of the Japanese 
soldiers, but also provoked, and not only in Germany, an increase of fears of a “yellow 
peril.” It was nevertheless obvious for any military observer that the two armies technically 
had nothing in common: “The Russian soldiers are masterly in retreat, whilst the Japanese 
are very unskilled in it.”  Kuropatkin, who after the war was personally blamed for the 30
Russian defeats, also emphasized the inequality of his troops and the Japanese soldiers 
when it came to capability, due to training and equipment.  The Russian war plan, 31
 Ibid., 95.24
 Berliner Lokal Anzeiger 400, August 26, 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170.  25
 “Das Aussehen des russischen Soldaten,” Hamburger Courier 500, November 4, 1904, BArch R 8034-II/26
8170.; “Russische Konserven,” Schlesische Zeitung 813, November 18, 1904, BArch R 8034-II/8170.  
 Oleg R. Airapetov, “The Russian Army’s Fatal Flaws,” in The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: 27
World War Zero vol.1, eds. John W. Steinberg et al. (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005), 163.  
 Imperial German General Consulate in China, Dr. Knappe, to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Shanghai, 28
December 17, 1904, BArch MArch, RM 5/5775.  
 “Die Zustände in der russischen Armee,” Vossische Zeitung 248, 27 May 1905, BArch R 8034-II/8170.  29
 Sakurai Tadayoshi, Human Bullets: A Soldier's Story of Port Arthur (Boston/New York: Houghton, Mifflin 30
and Company, 1907), 48.  
 Alexei Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War (New York: Dutton, 1909), vol.1, 241. For a 31
detailed analysis of Kuropatkin’s war diary, see: Hirono Yoshihiko “Kuropatokin Nihon Nikki ni tsuite 
(Thoughts on Kuropatkin’s Japan Diary),” in Nichiro Sensō Kenkyū no shin-shiten (New Research 
Perspectives on the Russo-Japanese War), ed. Nichiro Sensō Kenkyūkai (Yokohama: Seibunsha, 2005), 
31-45.  
however, was not an offensive one and the first defeats rather seemed to be a calculation, 
as the Naval Attaché for the Nordic Empires, Paul von Hintze (1864-1941), had reported 
from Russia in April 1904: “The Russians, with regard to their own announcements, were 
totally bargained for their check back after 9 February and for being driven back beyond 
Manchuria and losing control of the sea.”  One has to highlight here as well that although 32
the Russian Army never won a battle during the Russo-Japanese War, it remained a 
dangerous factor for Japan, whose military leaders realized the threat of the existence of 
an enemy force which could still be strengthened by further troop transports, while their 
own manpower seemed to be almost overstretched after extremely high casualties, as 
caused, for example, by the siege of Port Arthur during the previous months.  
Regardless of their heavy losses, the Japanese never stopped the attacks, something that 
caused a lot of admiration,  but also misconceptions about the role of spirit for the 33
success of an assault attack that would mislead so many military decision makers during 
the First World War – that they could overcome well defended positions just by better 
mental conditions. While piles of corpses and rivers of blood could be seen on the 
battlefield during the siege of Port Arthur and beyond, the German observers were 
cheering about the indestructible Japanese spirit: “Both officer and ordinary man knew 
what he was fighting for and invested his highest ambition to lose his life for his godlike 
ruler and ‘Dai Nippon’ on the battlefield.”  The military lessons were obviously poisoned 34
by a wish to believe that a frontal assault could still decide the war. 
In his article “Attack and Defense,” published in the Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung 
und Heereskunde (Quarterly Journal of Troop Leadership and Military Art), General Ludwig 
Freiherr von Falkenhausen (1844-1936) was convinced that the Japanese success had 
proved, according to the German interpretation of the war, that military commanders 
should rather take the initiative and seek to decide a battle by attacking the enemy with full 
forces.  It was obvious that the infantry and artillery needed to cooperate better, while the 35
role of the cavalry was reduced to an observing or pursuing force.  The Russians, argued 36
 Naval Attaché for the Nordic Empires, Paul von Hintze, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial 32
Naval Office, Berlin, St. Petersburg, April 1, 1904, BArch MArch, RM 5/5766, 4.
 Naval Attaché at the Japanese Embassy, Trummler, to His Majesty Emperor and King Wilhelm II, Tokyo, 33
December 29, 1904, BArch MArch RM 5/5769.  
 Military Report No. 18/06 of the Military Attaché in Tokyo, Major v. Etzel, to the Royal Prussian Ministry of 34
War, Berlin, Tokyo, February 25, 1906, BArch MArch, RM 5/5771.  
 General der Infanterie z.D. Frhr. v. Falkenhausen, “Angriff und Verteidigung,” Vierteljahrshefte für 35
Truppenführung und Heereskunde 3, no. 2 (1906): 390.
 Ibid., 398 and 403.36
Falkenhausen, only lost due to a failure in strategy, i.e. Kuropatkin’s decisions to retreat 
instead of a more aggressive attack being undertaken by the Czarist Army against the 
Japanese positions. The overall lesson seemed simple: “In my opinion the Russo-
Japanese War provides us after a longer break with another example to conclude that 
attack is the stronger form - or better expressed - the more effective means of warfare, 
something one however must well know and be capable of.”  But it was false lessons that 37
had been learned from the Russo-Japanese War, and when the soldiers of the First World 
War were sent into no man’s land, wave after wave, it was to die while being shot multiple 
times by machine guns, bleeding out in barbed wire or being physically destroyed while 
their bodies were torn apart by artillery shells.  The “Japanese spirit” (Yamato-damashii) 38
was deemed superior than the morale of the Russian soldier and the question of success 
was no longer solely related to leadership and equipment, to strategy and tactics, it was a 
question related to the mind. It was a doctrine that many military leaders would refer to 
when looking for answers to the stalemate of the trench war of the Western front of the 
Great War.  39
At the same time, the official German history of the Russo-Japanese War is steadily 
repeating the argument that a lack of professional military leadership, i.e. Prusso-German 
military leadership, was responsible for Russia’s defeat and therefore for the success of 
the Japanese soldiers. It was Russian indecisiveness that determined the outcome of the 
war.  The aggressive war plans in the years leading from the Russo-Japanese War to the 40
First World War  must consequently be considered a response to Japan’s victory, which 41
was considered more of a Russian failure than a Japanese success in the end.  
 Ibid., 411-413, quote from 413.37
 Gary P. Cox, “Of Aphorisms, Lessons, and Paradigms: Comparing the British and German Official 38
Histories of the Russo-Japanese War,” The Journal of Military History 56:3 (1992), 392.
 On the cultural history of this Japanese concept see: Saitō Shōji, “Yamatodamashii” no bunkashi (A 39
Cultural History of the “Japanese Spirit”) (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1973). For a detailed study on offensive military 
doctrines before the First World War see: Jack K. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision 
Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).  
 Cox, “Aphorisms,” 396-397.  40
 M. Christian Ortner, “Die Kriegs- und Aufmarschpläne Österreich-Ungarns, Deutschlands, Frankreichs und 41
Russlands im Juli 1914,“ in Erster Weltkrieg: Globaler Konflikt – Lokale Folgen – Neue Perspektiven, ed. 
Stefan Karner and Philipp Lesiak (Innsbruck/Wien/Bozen: StudienVerlag, 2014), 45-61.  
The Military Impact of the War in Germany 
The interest in the Russo-Japanese War in Germany was definitely existent, considering 
that there were quite a few publications dealing with the events in the Far East.  42
Especially after the Battle of Tsushima, the naval performance of the Russian sailors, who 
were said, in strong contrast to the sailors of the Japanese navy, to be incapable of 
maneuvering a ship and accurately firing its guns, was harshly criticized in German navy 
circles.  Some German observers went so far as to claim that “Russia … would never be 43
a great seapower.”  Russian Admiral Fyodor Avelan (1839-1916), in a private talk with 44
Paul von Hintze in July 1905, confessed the following facts about the Russian naval force: 
a) We knew that personnel reforms were needed. But the war prevented us from starting them. 
However we did not guess that the revolutionary movement would win so much ground within a 
year, as was shown by the riots in the navy. Propaganda was introduced to the ranks by the 
reservists. 
b) The recuperation of the material losses will be the next step in personnel reforms; new orders will 
only be issued when they are necessary to keep the Russian dockyards busy. This will only 
happen to provide the workers with tasks. Ships will be ordered later, as soon as the personnel 
question is solved.  
c) The navy would prefer to hold off on internal orders until the experiences of the Battle of Tsushima 
have been processed. However, this information is not available yet, because the Japanese do not 
allow captured Russian officers to send messages other than about their condition.  45
For the officers of the German navy, it was obvious that Russia would not be able to pose 
a threat against Germany’s Imperial Fleet in the near future. The naval military planners 
therefore could omit the Russian navy from their war plans for several years to come. 
However, the war would not only cause such considerations among German naval officers, 
as the success of Japan’s soldiers also played an important role with regard to the plans 
for a future war in the heart of Europe,. 
 A. Janson, Das Zusammenwirken von Heer und Flotte im russisch-japanischen Kriege 1904/5 (Berlin: 42
Eisenschmidt, 1905); Hauptmann Lothes, “Befestigte Flottenstützpunkte am Beispiel der Kwantung-
Halbinsel (Port Arthur 1898-1904),” Vierteljahreshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde 7 (1905), 
556-577; H. Polmann, Der Küstenkrieg und das strategische Zusammenwirken von Heer und Flotte im 
russisch-japanischen Kriege 1904/05 (Berlin: Mittler, 1912); E. Reventlow, Der russisch-japanische Krieg: 
Armeeausgabe (Berlin: C.A. Weller, 1906). Those who had observed the war also later published their 
experiences: Albert Hopman, Das Logbuch eines deutschen Seeoffiziers (Berlin: August Scheel, 1924). 
 German Embassy in China, von Mumm, to Chancellor Count von Bülow, Peiteiho, August 20, 1905, BArch 43
MArch, RM 5/5768.  
 “Der Kampf um die Seeherrschaft,“ Special Print from Marine-Rundschau, First Issue, 1906, BArch 44
MArch, RM 5/5771, 513.  
 Naval Attaché for the Nordic Empires, Paul von Hintze, to the State Secretary of the German Imperial 45
Naval Office, Berlin, St. Petersburg, July 14, 1905, BArch MArch, RM 5/5769.  
The chief of the German general staff, Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913), was well 
informed about the war in East Asia.  While Schlieffen, as well as many others like him, 46
might have initially believed in a final Russian victory, he changed his mind about Russia’s 
military strength as a consequence of the war and Japan’s steady successes on all 
Manchurian battlefields.  When the chief of the general staff was asked for his opinion 47
about Russia and its role in a possible war in Europe by Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow 
(1849-1929), Schlieffen gave an answer that highlights his conclusions being related to the 
experiences of the Russo-Japanese War, and therefore should be quoted at length here: 
Russia will, as soon as it signs peace with Japan, withdraw its army corps and divisions from East 
Asia. After around six months there will probably be the same number of troops in European Russia as 
there were at the beginning of 1904. It will be a bit longer before weapon and munition supplies are 
recovered and the artillery material is renewed. After a while the old army could be externally 
recovered. Internally, however, there will be many differences. We have known for a long time that the 
Russian army has no important leaders, and it was known that the majority of officers had little worth, 
and that the training of the troops could only be described as insufficient. In contrast, the Russian 
soldier was regarded as one of the best in the world. His unasked for loyalty, his patient perseverance, 
his calm defiance of death were recognized as invaluable qualities. Now the faith in these qualities has 
been badly shaken. The loyalty was not always truly blind. Many cases have been reported in which 
the officers did not order, but beg, persuade, or negotiate. … Troops rarely fought to their last [during 
the Manchurian campaigns]. … Most notably, the Russian soldier is not trained. He does not know 
how to shoot or to maneuver in battle. … The perfection of the armory now demands very careful 
training. Since the Russians did not receive it, they are no match for another army, and not useful in 
any attack. The East Asian war has shown that the Russian army was even worse than estimated by 
common sense, and the war did not improve it but made it worse. … It is doubtful there will be an 
improvement, since self-awareness is lacking. The Russians do not seek the reason for their defeat in 
their own general incapabilities, but in the superior numbers of their enemy and the inability of 
individual leaders. … It will therefore just match the natural development of things when the Russian 
army does not get better but worse.   48
Schlieffen eventually took the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War and incorporated them 
into his thoughts about a German two-front war against Russia in France, which he named 
Denkschrift für einen Krieg gegen Frankreich (Memorandum for a War against France, 
written during the winter of 1905/06), and which was later called and is usually referred to 
as the Schlieffen Plan.  Some elements of this plan would eventually be the basis for 49
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Germany’s early operations in the First World War,  although one has to be careful not to 50
conclude that the ideas of the plan remained fully uncontested or unchanged between 
1905 and 1914.  51
Due to the Russo-Japanese War, the military success of Japan, and the weak 
performance of the Russian officers and soldiers, Schlieffen could, as a consequence of 
his observations 
design a much more aggressive plan, which would be directed towards France during this particular 
window of opportunity of Russian absence. His Memorandum must consequently be read as a war 
plan for a limited time span, when the weakness of the Czarist Empire could be used to fight a war 
against the isolated French enemy. The plan was based on the idea that Germany would have a free 
hand against the Western “arch enemy” and be victorious in a fast war of four to six weeks. After the 
victory on the Western front, all troops would then turn towards the East to fight against the Russian 
steamroller.  52
Regardless of its bad performance, the idea of the “Russian steamroller” was still alive and 
Schlieffen did not change his considerations about the task with regard to a possible two-
front war. For Germany, France seemed to be the easier enemy and Russian weaknesses 
would just provide an easy start to the war, if these weaknesses, especially with regard to 
the mobilization of the Czarist Army, could be exploited to fight a fast war of annihilation 
against the French troops, before attacking the more dangerous enemy in the East later.  
It was Erich Ludendorff (1865-1937) who for a short time span considered a reversal of the 
Schlieffen idea, i.e. a victory against weak Russian troops in the East first before sending 
all forces against France, but as soon as Ludendorff was in full command and needed to 
find a solution to the military dilemma of the Western front, he also began to increase his 
focus on the war efforts against France and Britain, leaving Russia aside while profiting 
from the bad Russian performance and the eventual revolutions in 1917.  However, 53
Japan’s victory had changed not only the power relations in East Asia, but also the military 
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Russo-Japanese War is provided in the same chapter.
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thinking, especially with regard to the image of Russia’s military might, for the years to 
come.  
Conclusion 
The Japanese attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in the night of 8/9 February 1904 
was probably only a real surprise for the Czar and his military advisors. What was a 
surprise for the whole world were Japan’s uninterrupted victories on land and sea. British 
and American newspapers cheered about these victories, as a defeat for Russia also 
resembled a defeat for an autocratic regime and an imperial contestant in East Asia, 
especially in China. The Japanese became known as “Asia’s Prussians,” gallant soldiers 
who treated their enemies and POWs even better than the latter were usually treated by 
their own officers and governments.  Japan’s soldiers – regardless of a growing fear 54
related to the idea of a “yellow peril” – were perceived as well trained, well equipped, and 
extremely loyal to the Japanese Emperor and state. Without question they were sacrificing 
themselves when wave after wave of human bullets (nikudan kōgeki) surged against the 
fortress walls at Port Arthur, creating mountains of bodies and rivers of blood. Eventually, 
their behavior would lead to the military misconception that soldiers’ spirit could decide 
their military fate, an idea that would be disproved by the actual experiences of the First 
World War a decade later. 
In the case of Germany, the Japanese victories were considered indirect German victories, 
since the Japanese officer corps had been trained by Prussian soldiers during the Asian 
country’s Westernization process. The sailors, soldiers, and officers in Japan’s navy and 
army were in addition only considered successful due to Russian incapabilities. If the 
Russian Army had been led by German officers, as the usual narrative highlighted, its 
performance might have been much better. In contrast to many other military observers, 
the German officers and observers were in a way determined by racist views and a non-
acceptance of Japan as a real great power. While the Japanese Empire eventually proved 
to be an equal member of the concert of powers in East Asia, in Germany, the military 
weakness of Russia in the aftermath of the war was of much more interest than Japan’s 
military strength. War planners, like Alfred von Schlieffen, had to deal with new facts and 
answered them by a reconfiguration of war plans for the case for a two-front war.  
 Kita Yoshito, “Nichi-Ro Sensō to jindōshugi: Matsuyama furyo shūyōjo ni okeru Roshia shōbyōsha kyūgo 54
no kentō” (The Russo-Japanese War and Humanitarianism: A Study of the Measures for Relief for Russian 
Wounded and Sick in the Matsuyama POW Camp), Nihon Hōgaku 80:2 (2014), 591-627; Mōri Yoshihiko, 
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All in all, the cultural arrogance of some of the observers and military personnel in 
Germany led to a misperception of the war. The actual strength of the Japanese was only 
considered possible due to Russian weakness, and this caused extreme strategic 
misconceptions for the future. If the interest in Japan’s success had been more intense, 
one might have realized that a defensive position was much better for a war that was 
increasingly determined by modern technology than human spirit. Eventually, there was no 
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